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PRINCIPLES OF FAIRNESS FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC TREATIES: CONSTRUCTIVISM 
AND CONTRACTUALISM
John Linarelli
Rules are “mere labels for more complex ideas.”1
I. Introduction
Longstanding discontent persists about the role of international economic institutions 
in the global economy.  Some perceive globalization as producing substantial injustice.2
Those who find globalization to be good blithely dismiss the objections of those who do 
not.  Writing on the protests that occurred at the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
Seattle Ministerial Conference, Thomas Friedman wrote in the New York Times, “Is there 
anything more ridiculous in the news today than the protests against the World Trade 
Organization in Seattle?”  Friedman called the protestors “a Noah’s ark of flat-earth 
advocates, protectionist trade unions and yuppies looking for their 1960s fix.”3  It seems 
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 For example, the French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu says that globalization: 
is a myth in the strong sense of the word, a powerful discourse, an idea force, an idea 
which has social force, which obtains belief . . . It ratifies and glorifies the reign of what 
are called financial markets, in other words, the return of a kind of radical capitalism, 
with no other law than that of maximum profit, an unfettered capitalism without any 
disguise, but rationalized, pushed to the limit of its economic efficacy by the introduction 
of modern forms of domination, such as “business administration,” and techniques of 
manipulation such as market research and advertising. . . .  In short, globalization is not 
homogenization; on the contrary, it is the extension of the hold of a small number of 
dominant nations over the whole set of national financial markets.
PIERRE BOURDIEU, ACTS OF RESISTANCE: AGAINST THE TYRANNY OF THE MARKET __ (1999).
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2like neither side knows that the other is talking about - a cognitive or linguistic inability 
to understand each other.
Much of the criticism of the WTO and the other multinational economic institutions 
focuses on the power of multinational enterprises.  What power do multinationals 
actually exert on the policies and operations of these institutions?  The influence of the 
multinational enterprises has been difficult to articulate and explain in terms familiar to 
lawyers and policy makers.  We have trouble breaking out of the barriers we are educated 
to respect.  Public choice theory informs us that we should be concerned about the 
influence of powerful lobbying groups who work within the political processes of the 
governments of the WTO members themselves.  These interest groups, the story goes, 
capture the negotiating positions of powerful WTO members and influence the agenda, as 
it is set in the WTO negotiating rounds and in the work done between the rounds.  They 
exercise a similar sway over the policies and operations of other international economic 
institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the development banks.  For 
example, if we want to understand the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), we might want to inquire about the role of the 
pharmaceutical industry, of the film and recording industries, in assisting the United 
States Government in formulating negotiating positions for TRIPS.  The argument is that 
these interest groups persuade the governments of high-income countries that TRIPS 
should contain a strong set of intellectual property protections that go far beyond the 
traditional remit of what the GATT/WTO framework ever aspired to previously.4
Because of such influence, the argument goes, the multinationals are able to get what 
4 See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention 
Regulations Need to be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 519 (1999).
3they want, and what they want results in unfair agreements.  The WTO agreements, the 
argument continues, comply with few or no standards of fairness, or if they do, it is 
accidental.  They may lower tariffs and barriers to trade in services so that companies can 
effectively operate across borders, but they may also maintain barriers to trade to protect 
powerful interests who benefit from protectionism.  These are the arguments.  I 
summarize them; I do not necessarily accept them, at least in their simple form.
Does the divisiveness derive from a lack of a consensus on a theory of justice with 
which we can deliberate about the merits of international economic agreements?  No 
legal system deserving of continued support can exist without an adequate theory of 
justice.  This article is about the elaboration of a theory of justice to underpin 
international economic law and international economic institutions.  A world trade 
constitution cannot credibly exist without a clear notion of justice upon which to base a 
consensus.  Despite attempts to describe a world trade “legal system” or constitution, no 
such system or constitution yet exists in a way credible to many people.  There is yet no 
consensus on the public reason underpinning the rules and the institutions.  Much of the 
anti-globalization dissent, though sometimes unfocused and confused, seems bottomed 
on the basic notion that a legal system requires a theory of justice.  Governments will 
never get their populaces to embrace international economic law and institutions without 
a consensus on what is just in the international economic sphere.  Scholars and 
practitioners have expended great effort in improving our understanding of world trade 
rules and policies, but the normative dimensions of such inquiry seems incomplete 
without an underlying consensus of sufficiently wide scope on the reasons for the rules 
and policies.  That the rules and policies now encroach upon areas of domestic regulation 
in sensitive policy areas serves to highlight the problem.  
4Economic efficiency has been the benchmark often used to evaluate the merits of 
international economic agreements.  Economic efficiency is a commonly understood 
aspiration embedded in the idea of progressive liberalization; the progressiveness of 
liberalization is determined based on efficiency gains.  I have no qualms about economic 
efficiency.  I think it is a valuable tool and I think economists bring a very useful toolkit 
to the table.  I am not going to expend any effort in bashing economics because such 
bashing is wrongheaded.  I refocus away from economics, however, away from the 
efficiency versus distribution dimensions of conceptualizing the effects of international 
economic institutions.  I devote this article to examining approaches to understanding the 
allocation of resources that most economists are unwilling to devote much energy 
analyzing.   I have nothing against economics, but I do not see how we can base a 
constitutional system solely on it.  None in fact is.  Politicians really are not that 
interested in efficiency.  Why should efficiency be the default rule?  Not everyone 
accepts it.
One of the questions I explore is Kantian in influence: is there a constructivist 
procedure that is both universal and cosmopolitan, that we can apply to understand 
international economic agreements better – to improve our deliberation about the WTO 
and to develop a consensus on what is and is not acceptable?   This article is located 
firmly in moral philosophy and hangs closely to deontological approaches to moral 
philosophy.  No critical or postmodern approaches are undertaken.  
The article examines alternatives to the question of what should be a proper 
distributional framework for the design of international economic treaties and 
institutions. There are many standards, intended primarily for application to nation-states 
but extended here to global society.  In this article, I discuss two approaches, those of 
5John Rawls and T.M. Scanlon, with the focus primarily on Scanlon’s work.  The natural 
starting point for any discussion of moral theory in the context of social institutions is 
Rawls’s A Theory of Justice.5  I will not expend as much effort on Rawls as I should, 
though he offers the most influential account.6  I cannot avoid Rawls.  Rawls wrote the 
most influential piece of moral philosophy in the twentieth century.  His A Theory of 
Justice must form a base to discuss a cousin theory that has gained a good deal of recent 
popularity, the contractualist account of T.M. Scanlon, the most recent elaboration of 
which is in Scanlon’s What We Owe to Each Other.7  Both accounts protect each person; 
this feature is what distinguishes them from utilitarianism.  
We could focus on other theories.  I would have to write a book rather than an article 
if I were to exhaustively survey theories in competition with Rawls’s theory of justice, 
but it is worth at least brief mention of a few.  Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum 
propose that governments should maximize people’s basic capabilities.8  To Sen and 
Nussbaum, some goods are inputs needed to function in society.  They propose that 
governments equalize the ability to function in a society.  The capabilities approach has 
had some influence on the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which in 
1993 began to assess quality of life using the concept of people’s capabilities.9  Ronald 
5 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (rev. ed. 1999).
6
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7 SCANLON, supra note 1.
8 AMARTYA SEN, ON ECONOMIC INEQUALITY (1973); Amartya Sen, Equality of What? in THE TANNER 
LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 197-220 (S. McMurrin ed. 1980); AMARTYA SEN, INEQUALITY 
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6Dworkin argues that there should be equality of basic resources available to persons, with 
a mechanism for valuing nontransferable resources (such as native talent) in terms of 
transferable resources.10  Gerard Cohen argues for equalizing access to advantage.11  I 
could go on with this list.  Let me mention just one more because her theory will get lots 
of play in the coming years.  Susan Hurley articulates a cognitivist theory of distributive 
justice, which aims to neutralize bias, to develop greater public agreement on what is 
good.12  Hurley’s idea of cognitive theory focuses on the meta-ethics of justice concepts.  
She wants to solve the problem of the divide between private and public reason that 
Rawls deals with in Political Liberalism.13
I do not discuss rules in a comprehensive way, though I do “apply” the tools set forth 
in this article to one persistent problem – the regulation of intellectual property rights at 
the WTO level and access to pharmaceuticals in low-income countries.  Rules are very 
important.  Nevertheless, I do not think this project is at the stage yet where I can offer 
systematic applications of the decision procedures set forth in this article.  At most, one 
could say that this article is about what lawyers call policies about rules.  The focus is on 
how to evaluate whether a rule is desirable or not based on an underlying value.  This 
article is representative of a project, one to articulate philosophical thought about justice 
for application in the future, perhaps to compare with efficiency results.   Looking at 
theories of justice seems required if governments are to come up with meaningful cross-
cultural comparisons of quality of life.  What are the norms for evaluating the so-called 
10
 Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 283 (1981); 
Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS ___ (1981).
11Gerard A. Cohen, On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice, 99 ETHICS 906-44 (1989).
12 SUSAN L. HURLEY, JUSTICE, LUCK AND KNOWLEDGE (2003).
13 JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1995).
7constitutional order?  We cannot claim to have a constitutional order without 
understanding what that order is based upon.  It is difficult to have a conversation about 
global injustice without common standards. 
So many ways of approaching this project exist that undoubtedly I am open to 
criticism for failing to address something.  I have been very selective in this article.  
Some may see as a glaring omission that I am not expending much effort discussing 
human rights.  Others have said much more about human rights that I can say.  For 
discussions from the perspective of philosophy see publications by Pogge14 and 
Habermas,15 and from the perspective of a philosophically informed legal scholar see 
publications by Petersmann.16  If this is a weakness in my approach, it is one shared with 
others.   Onora O’Neill, for example, a prominent Kantian, in her important work on 
justice explains that “[t]he most significant structures of ethical concern can be expressed 
in linked webs of requirements, which are better articulated by beginning from the 
perspective of agents and their obligations rather than that of claimants and their 
rights.”17  The idea here is that “there can be requirements on us that no one has any 
standing to require of us.”18  Whether we want to “legalize” these requirements to 
14 See, e.g., Thomas Pogge, Human Rights and Human Responsibilities, in De Greiff & Cronin, supra note 
8, at 151-95.
15 See, e.g., Jürgen Habermas, On Legitimation Through Human Rights, in De Greiff & Cronin, supra note 
8, at 197-214.
16 See, e.g., Ernst Ulrich Petersmann, The WTO Constitution and Human Rights, 3 J. INT’L ECON. L. 19 
(2000); Ernst Ulrich Petersmann, Human Rights and International Economic Law in the Twenty-First 
Century: The Need to Clarify Their Relationship, 4 J. INT’L ECON. L. 3 (2001); Ernst Ulrich Petersmann, 
From Negative to Positive Integration in the WTO: Time for “Mainstreaming Human Rights” into WTO 
Law?, 37 COMMON MARKET L. REV. 1363 (2000). 
17 ONORA O’NEILL, TOWARDS JUSTICE AND VIRTUE: A CONSTRUCTIVE ACCOUNT OF PRACTICAL 
REASONING 4 (1996).
18
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8produce legally binding obligations, so that someone has such standing in the courts, is a 
question for policy makers informed by the standards found in this and in other works.
II. Rule Orientation and Implications for Fairness
One of the most significant achievements of the Uruguay Round was the negotiation 
of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU).  The DSU creates the rules and the 
institutions for binding settlement of disputes relating to WTO agreements between or 
among WTO members.  The DSU by its own terms, explains that “[t]he dispute 
settlement system of the WTO is a central element in providing security and 
predictability to the multilateral trading system.”19  The DSU is an important stage in the 
evolution of the world trading system towards legalism, in which “legalist” approaches to 
dispute settlement in the world trading system evolve from “pragmatist” approaches, 
based primarily in diplomacy.20  Some contend that there is a move towards legalization 
in the international sphere generally, and that the WTO is one good example of this 
trend.21
Jackson’s rule-versus-power orientation is one of the most important and well-known 
insights in the literature on world trade law.22  In making this distinction Jackson, a 
careful scholar, made few claims about the justice of the rules.  He does not say that the 
WTO agreements and institutions constitute a legal system.  But he opened the way for 
19
 WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, art. 3.2.
20 See G. Richard Schell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the World 
Trade Organization, 44 DUKE L. J. 829 (1995).
21 Id.; LEGALIZATION AND WORLD POLITICS (Judith Goldstein, Miles Kahler, Robert Keohane & Anne-
Marie Slaughter eds. 2001).
22 JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: LAW AND POLICY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
RELATIONS (2nd ed. 1997).  
9thinking about whether the WTO is actually a legal system.  Some scholars claim that the 
WTO system is constitutional, that a “world trade constitution” exists.23  Others, relying 
on positivist notions of the law found in Hart and even in Austin, make claims about the 
existence of a world trade legal system.24
Two kinds of theories about the international legal order are influential in the present 
day: positivist and instrumental.25  Both these theories maintain longstanding 
relationships going back to Bentham, who was both a positivist and a utilitarian.  Both 
approaches fail to provide adequate accounts of justice.  Positivism is obsessed with the 
pedigree of rules.  In its exclusive form, it requires the separation of law and morality and 
in its inclusive form; it denies any necessary connection between law and morality but 
admits that a connection between law and morality is possible.  Clearly, positivism does 
not require any moral criteria to assess the pedigree of legal rules.  Instrumentalists, most 
notably law and economics scholars, argue that concepts of justice are rhetorical.  Eric 
Posner and Jack Goldsmith, for example, argue that states use “moralistic and legalistic
rhetoric” to advance their own interests.26  Why this rhetoric (if it is rhetoric) is less 
helpful in furthering our understanding than the metaphors of game theory, such as 
23
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24
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Palmeter, The WTO as a Legal System, 24 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 444 (2000).
25
 I do not claim that positivists who are known as founders of the school of thought held the view that 
international law is law.  See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 213-37 (reprint ed. 1994), in which 
Hart offers his famous argument that international law is an important set of social, as opposed to legal, 
rules.  In Hartian positivism, the basic problem with international law is the lack of secondary rules of 
recognition.  Many have taken on these arguments and have convincingly demonstrated that international 
law, at least in its contemporary level of development, is law.  See, e.g., ALLEN BUCHANAN, JUSTICE, 
LEGITIMACY AND SELF DETERMINATION: MORAL FOUNDATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW 46-48 (2004). 
No need exists to go into this topic here, since the point of the above analysis is simply that lawyers 
conceptualize WTO law in positivistic terms.
26
 Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Moral and Legal Rhetoric in International Relations: A Rational 
Choice Perspective, http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=250042 (last visited June 21, 2005); see 
also JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005).
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“cheap talk” and “signaling” is for another article, but what the law and economics 
approach fails to identify is their longstanding connection to a discredited Benthamism.  
Law and economics scholars make the same arguments about justice that Bentham did in 
the eighteenth century.  In The Principles of Morals and Legislation," Bentham explains 
in a footnote that “justice, in the only sense in which it has a meaning, is an imaginary 
personage, feigned for the convenience of discourse, whose dictates are the dictates of 
utility, applied to certain particular cases. Justice, then, is nothing more than an imaginary 
instrument, employed to forward on certain occasions, and by certain means, the 
purposes of benevolence."27  In The Theory of Legislation, Bentham says that he uses the 
words "just" and "unjust" along with other words "simply as collective terms including 
the ideas of certain pains or pleasures."28
One of the major defects that positivism and instrumentalism share is that if we 
assume that they provide adequate accounts for legal principles, either in pedigree or in 
rational choice, then they produce bad counterexamples.  It is easy to come up with a 
system of positivistic and efficient rules that are unjust.  Justice simply is not a criterion 
in these accounts.  
These two prevailing accounts of international economic law, then, positivism and 
instrumentalism, when combined with concepts from both the normative welfare 
economics of international trade and from the political economy of international trade, 
produce a quasi-utilitarian framework for the assessment of international economic law 
27 JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (J.H. Burns, 
H.L.A. Hart & F. Rosen eds. rev. ed 1970) ch. x, footnote 2 to section XL.
28 JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 3 (C. K. Ogden ed.1931).  These references are 
discussed in John Rawls, Justice as Fairness, a 1958 article appearing in the Philosophical Review, and 
now reprinted in JOHN RAWLS, COLLECTED PAPERS 48-49 (Samuel Freeman ed. 1999).
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and institutions.29  Quasi-utilitarianism is, it seems, is the default principle.  I use the term 
quasi-utilitarianism because economics is distinct from utilitarianism, particularly from 
the Millian version of utilitarianism, and because I do not think there is an explicit 
recognition of utilitarianism as the actual reasons for action in the making of international 
economic law and policy.
Quasi-utilitarianism has so many problems that I do not know where to begin. 
Distinguishing other ethical theories from utilitarianism and the broader notion of 
consequentialism has been one of the major debating tournaments of modern moral 
philosophy and others far more capable than I have dealt with the issues in depth.  I 
mention just a few weaknesses of utilitarianism here, relevant to international economic 
law and policy.  How does quasi-utilitarianism work?  The problems are in average 
utility, the greatest good for the greatest number, and in concepts like Pareto efficiency.  
These measures fail to account for effects on the worst off.  They focus wholly on states 
of affairs and not on principles.30  Quasi-utilitarianism tends to engage in an improper 
aggregation of the effect of a policy into a single judgment, giving inadequate attention to 
the distributive effects of the policy.  Aggregation tends to disguise the adverse effects of 
a policy on groups who suffer substantial burdens or who may be worse off in the society 
in question.31  Quasi-utilitarianism does not deal with the basic problems of desert and
luck - that the well-being of people depends on the natural lottery and on social and 
29
 I borrow the “quasi-utilitarianism” phrase from Carl Cranor, The Genomic Revolution and Intra-National 
and Inter-National Equity (unpub., on file with the author).
30
 The distinction between a focus on states of affairs or principles is this: In quasi-utilitarian ways of 
thinking, people’s preferences, desires and satisfactions are not analyzable and given, and from these one 
determines how to increase or maximize these preferences, desires and satisfactions.  In a principles-based 
account, we evaluate the content of these preferences, desires and satisfactions to decide if they are right or 
wrong, or good or bad.  In an approach based on principles, we might decide that an action is impermissible 
even though it may increase the satisfaction of the agent or agents in question.
31 Id.
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historic circumstances.  Joseph Raz has provided the example of how an act utilitarian 
must commit to the claim that an extra lick of ice cream for a sufficiently large number of 
people can justify the killing of another person, if the trivial satisfactions of the many that 
get the extra licks outweigh the loss suffered by the person killed.32  Utilitarian and quasi-
utilitarian concepts do not link to concepts humans seem to possess of right and wrong.  
It is telling that we do not teach our children to be utilitarian, but rather, we try to instill 
in them the reason-giving force of right and wrong.
III. Fairness Theories
My project is to set forth some alternatives to the current default rule of quasi-
utilitarianism, so that we may better understand the fairness of international economic 
law and institutions.  As explained above, the natural starting point for any such 
discussion is Rawls’s A Theory of Justice.  Before I take on the substantive accounts, 
some groundwork is necessary.
At the outset, we must be cautious in extending contractualism to provide an account 
of public morality.  Scanlon explains that contractualism applies only to individual 
conduct.33  It is intended for application to the basic question that moral philosophers try 
to answer, and that is “how should one live.”  The focus of inquiry in contractualism is 
thus plainly distinguishable from that of Rawls’ A Theory of Justice, which has as its 
explicit target an account of a public morality.  Rawls elaborates in Justice as Fairness: A 
Restatement, that his principles concern “the basic structure of society, that is, its main 
political and social institutions and how they fit together into one unified system of social 
32 JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1988).
33 SCANLON, supra note 1, at 228. 
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cooperation.”34  Considerable problems may appear in trying to extend contractualism 
from the private to the public sphere, but considerable promise exists in such an 
extension nonetheless.  We will have to work out these problems or contractualism 
ultimately will not make the move into the political and legal realms.
      The theories that I discuss all deal in concepts about principles.35  They do not focus 
solely on states of affairs, as economics, utilitarianism and other forms of 
consequentialism do.  Both Rawls and Scanlon blend the two values.  They permit a 
focus on states of affairs, but states of affairs cannot trump principles of fairness.  Neither 
theorist is neutral about principles.  Scanlon starts his hugely influential work on
contractualism with an account that places his theory within descriptivism, but with little 
in the way of the metaphysical baggage often associated with such discussion.36
Rawls’s work is constructivist.  Rawls did not use that term in A Theory of Justice.  In 
A Theory of Justice, he does discuss the idea of construction, that his principles of justice 
provide “constructive criteria” for guiding action.37  Rawls distinguishes constructivist 
from intuitionist approaches.  He argues that intuitionism produces a set of impractical 
and unranked moral principles and thus does not help to guide action.38  Thus, the major 
distinction is between constructivism and realism.39  In a constructivist moral theory, 
34 JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 39-40 (Erin Kelly ed. 2001).
35 See supra note 30 for a discussion of the distinction between ethical approaches that focus on states of 
affairs versus principles.
36 SCANLON, supra note 1, at 2.
37
 Onora O’Neill, Constructivism versus Contractualism, 16 RATIO 319 (2003).
38 Id.  Rawls makes the same distinctions about Kant.  JOHN RAWLS, LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF 
MODERN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 237-38 (Barbara Herman ed. 2000).
39
 I use the word “realism” in its philosophical sense and not as used in legal thought to refer to legal 
realism. The two theories are radically different.
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moral principles are not “fabric of the universe.”40  They are not facts independent of and 
prior to moral reasoning.  They however, have validity and are correct when they are the 
product of a procedure in which a human agent engages in practical reason to articulate 
and live by a moral principle.  In his Lectures on the History of Modern Moral 
Philosophy, Rawls explains that Kant is a constructivist.  “An essential feature of Kant’s 
moral constructivism is that the particular categorical imperatives that give the content of 
the duties of justice and virtue are viewed as specified by a procedure of construction (the 
CI procedure). . . .”41  Constructivists do not have to be Kantian.  Utilitarians are 
constructivists, as is the neo-Hobbsian David Gauthier.42  Rawls is a Kantian 
constructivist.  In his 1980 Dewey Lecture, entitled “Kantian Constuctivism in Moral 
Theory,” Rawls “set out more clearly the Kantian roots of A Theory of Justice”  and to 
elaborate more clearly the Kantian form of constructivism.43
Rawls is also a contractualist.  In A Theory of Justice, Rawls places his work 
within the social contract tradition of Kant, Locke and Rousseau.44  Scanlon places his 
work in the tradition of Rousseau.45  O’Neill argues that we can read Scanlon to be a 
constructivist.46  To avoid confusion, I use the contractualist label to refer to Scanlon and 
the constructivist label to refer to Rawls.  
40 See JOHN L. MACKIE, ETHICS, INVENTING RIGHT AND WRONG (reprint ed. 1991).
41 RAWLS, LECTURES, supra note 38, at 237.
42
 O’Neill, Constructivism Versus Contractualism, supra note 38, at 320, DAVID GAUTHIER, MORALS BY 
AGREEMENT (reprint ed. 1987).
43 RAWLS, LECTURES, supra note 38, at xiii.
44 RAWLS, THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 5, at section 3; xviii.
45 SCANLON, supra note 1, at 5.
46
 O’Neill, Constructivism Versus Contractualism, supra note 37. 
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A. Rawls: Kantian Constructivism
A threshold question is whether we can apply Rawlsian justice as fairness outside of 
the confines of domestic society.  Rawls himself refused to extend his theory to 
international contexts, but many Rawlsians have argued that the conditions now hold for 
application of Rawlsian theory at the international level.  I will not restate those 
arguments here.47  The extension is justified because of the lack of economic self-
sufficiency and distributional autonomy between states.48  The WTO and other 
international economic institutions no doubt had a hand in bringing these two conditions 
into existence.  
The Rawlsian theory of justice as fairness is about social justice or public morality.  
In A Theory of Justice, Rawls explains that the “primary subject” of his principles is “the 
basic structure of society, the arrangement of social institutions into one scheme of 
cooperation.”49  Rawls elaborates in Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, that his 
principles concern “the basic structure of society, that is, its main political and social 
institutions and how they fit together into one unified system of social cooperation.”50
These principles, Rawls continues, “are to govern the assignment of rights and duties in 
these institutions and they are to determine the appropriate distribution of the benefits and 
burdens of social life.”51  They “must not be confused with the principles which apply to 
individuals and their actions in particular circumstances.”52
47 See Garcia, supra note 7; Buchanan, supra note 25. 
 
48
 Garcia, supra note 7; Buchanan, supra note 25, at 200-27.
49 RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 5, at 47.
50 Id., at 39-40.
51 Id., at 3.
52 Id.
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The basic structure of the Rawlsian conception of justice is that if mutually self-
interested and rational persons stand in relation to each other behind a veil of ignorance 
in the original position, and if they must choose a conception of the right to order their 
claims on society in the circumstances of justice, they will agree on two lexically ordered 
principles of justice.  The first principle of justice is that society guarantees each person 
an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a 
similar scheme of liberties for others.  The second principle of justice is that society 
should arrange social and economic inequalities so that two criteria are met: (1) positions 
and offices should be open to everyone equally; and (2) social and economic inequalities 
should benefit everyone regardless of social group.53
The focus in discussions of global economic questions has mainly been on the second 
principle, which has clear implications for assessing the distributive justice of 
international economic law and institutions.  I like others place less emphasis on the first 
principle, so we do not have to get into the question of public reason on mainly non-
economic civil society issues to any great depth.  The first principle, dealing with basic 
liberties and freedoms, goes to the heart of sovereignty.  It is the subject of domestic 
constitutional orders, but also of international human rights and international criminal law 
regimes.  As these international regimes proliferate, some of the responsibilities for 
securing the first principle move to the international level.  That is not my concern here.  
That the first trumps the second is important for understanding why we should not lightly 
allow international legal orders to override fair domestic legal orders.  The first principle 
retains its lexical priority institutionally to the extent that governments refuse to agree to 
53 Id., at 60.  I am grateful to Carl Cranor for input on the basic structure of the argument. Carl Cranor, 
Rawlsian Choice of Distributive Principles (unpub., on file with the author).
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treaties that derogate from basic rights and freedoms provided domestically.  Difficulties 
may arise, however, if international tribunals, such as the WTO Dispute Settlement Body, 
issue decisions that trump basic rights granted domestically.  This is an issue for another 
article. 
Let us look a bit more closely at the second principle.  Rawls contends that if we 
place persons behind a veil of ignorance in the original position, they would choose the 
difference and fair equality of opportunity principles as principles of equality.  At the risk 
of oversimplifying, the reason for the selection of these principles in the original position 
is because Rawls does not want to base the distribution of primary social goods (rights, 
liberties, opportunities, income and wealth) or primary natural goods (health, intelligence 
and imagination) on initial endowments obtained through luck.  When they are behind the 
veil of ignorance in the original position, people do not know their endowments of these 
goods.  
The second principle permits inequality, and persons can use their unequal 
endowments to their own benefit, as long as institutions provide incentives to benefit 
everyone, and in particular the worst off.  Let us unpack this second principle.  It itself 
contains two principles, the fair equality of opportunity principle and the difference 
principle.  
The fair equality of opportunity principle holds that positions and offices that result in 
social and economic inequalities must be open to all.  It does not assume or ensure that 
everyone is equal in talents, abilities and motivation.  But, for individuals who are equal 
in talents, abilities and motivations, they should have an equal chance of attaining the 
same positions in a given society.  Under the fair equality of opportunity principle, social 
and, in our context here, national starting points are irrelevant because they are arbitrary.
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The difference principle essentially provides that inequality must benefit everyone.  
As long as the primary social goods of the worst off group are increasing, inequality is 
fair and can continue to increase.  As soon as the primary social goods of the worst off 
group stop increasing, then the society in question has reached the maximum inequality 
permitted.  We can add other groups into this picture.  Suppose the welfare of the worst 
off group plateaus but society could continue to make the best off group (or any better off 
group) better off with no detriment to the worst off group.  Is such a move fair?  
Inequality can continue, but we have to examine the effects on other groups.  Consider 
the second worst off group.  If during increasing inequality, the lot of the second worst 
off group is increasing, so long as society does not make the worst off group even worse 
off, inequality can continue to increase.  The point at which increasing inequality must 
stop is at the point at which society could make no more moves without making the worst 
off group or the second worse off group even more badly off.  We can generalize the 
account to n groups.  The emerging concept is the difference principle: A scheme of 
cooperation is fair if, in the given historical and social circumstances, society can make 
no further move that would make all (every one) of the representative groups better off.54
In other words, pick a regime of norms that makes everyone better off than they would be 
under any other regime of norms.
Rawls’s theory of justice combines two prevailing approaches to moral theory.  It is 
principled.  It has a procedure of construction for determining the content of fairness. The 
veil of ignorance and original position is a universalizing procedure, as is Kant’s 
categorical imperative procedure.  Rawls uses principles to evaluate states of affairs.  In 
this way his theory is a hybrid.  Rawls does not rely solely on the analysis of states of 
54
 I am grateful to Carl Cranor for guidance on the difference principle.  Id.
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affairs, as utilitarianism does, but states of affairs surely are important in assessing the lot 
of groups in society, particularly the worst off.  As we shall see in the following part, 
Scanlon’s contractualism shares this hybrid feature.
The relevance of Rawls’s theory of justice to the normativity of international 
economic law and institutions is remarkable.  It is no wondering that so many have 
extended Rawls to the international realm.  
B. Scanlon: Contractualism
In 1982, T. M. Scanlon published an influential article entitled “Contractualism and 
Utilitarianism,” in which he first proposed his contractualist account of morality.55  He 
since wrote a book on contractualism, What We Owe to Each Other, which revised some 
of his views, partly in response to critics.56  Contractualism has gotten quite a bit of 
attention in moral philosophical circles, and it is worth investigating its application to 
institutions.  I will not present anything like a complete account of contractualism here.  I 
want to get to the structure of the contractualist argument, to understand its application.  
The meta-ethical, epistemological and metaphysical questions are for discussion in other 
venues.  Despite the lack of a link to the political realm, I think the best use of 
contractualism is as a heuristic for evaluating global economic treaties.  Contractualism is 
an ethical framework that has the potential to produce increased attention to fairness in 
the global economic order.
Scanlon states the basic working principle of contractualism as follows: “an act is 
wrong if its performance under the circumstances would be disallowed by any set of 
55
 T.M. Scanlon, Contractualism and Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 103 (Amartya Sen & 
Bernard Williams, eds. 1982).
56 SCANLON, supra note 1.
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principles for the general regulation of behavior that no one could reasonably reject as 
the basis for informed, unforced general agreement.”57  Scanlon prefers the negative 
formulation to the affirmative “that everyone could reasonably accept” because 
“unanimous acceptance is a consequence of this condition’s being fulfilled, but is not 
itself the basic idea.”58  Scanlon did not intend to formulate anything like a Pareto 
optimality requirement.  Cohen has argued that an equivalent formulation for “no one 
could reasonably reject” would be “everyone must reasonably accept.”59  Arguably, these 
phrases are equivalent, but it is best to use the phrase adopted by Scanlon, since it is his 
theory.
In contractualism, the basis for moral wrongness or rightness lies in mutual 
recognition, a kind of mutuality.  Mutual recognition lies in the motivational basis for 
contractualism.  Scanlon’s contractualism is not Hobbsian.  People do not enter into 
agreement out of any reasons of self-interest.60  Scanlon explains:
What distinguishes my view from other accounts involving ideas of 
agreement is its conception of the motivational basis of this agreement.  
The parties whose agreement is in question are assumed not merely to be 
seeking some kind of advantage but also to be moved by the aim of 
finding principles that others, similarly motivated, could not reasonably 
reject.61
57 SCANLON, supra note 1, at 153.
58 Id., at 390, n. 8.
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 Brad W. Hooker, Scanlon’s Contractualism, the Spare Wheel Objection, and Aggregation, 
http//www.ucl.ac.uk/spp/download/seminars/Scanlons_Contractualism.rtf (last visited June 21, 2005).
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 For a contemporary Hobbsian account see Gauthier, supra note 42. 
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Contractualism reflects the “idea of a shared willingness to modify our private demands 
in order to find a basis of justification that others also have reason to accept.”62  The 
philosophical lineage of Scanlon’s contractualism goes back to Rousseau, not Hobbes.63
A key aspect of Scanlon’s contractualism is its justification requirement.  Justification 
is necessary to his theory in two ways: first as a normative basis for determining the 
content of morality – for determining right and wrong – and second as a way of 
characterizing that content.  The focus of characterization is in something like a 
constructivist procedure, in determining rightness or wrongness based on justification to 
others.64  In this sense, Scanlonian contractualism does not need a veil of ignorance.  The 
veil is unnecessary because contractualism internalizes the requirement of justifiability in 
the reasonable rejection standard.  The concept of avoiding a bias of self-interest exists in 
the requirement of taking action that others could not reasonably reject.  The motivational 
basis for the reasonable rejection requirement already requires that agents consider 
others.  Scanlon does not need to impose a veil of ignorance requirement in order to get 
to the point where people will be other-regarding.65  The lack of connection to Hobbes 
seems clear.
Contractualism accounts for morality in a narrow sense.  It does not concern morality 
in a broader sense, where it has to do with a range of issues of individual moral conduct 
that do no harm or violate any duties to others.66  For example, contractualism does no 
work towards helping us understand whether harming the environment in and of itself is 
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Id., at 189.
65 Id., at 207.
66 SCANLON, supra note 1, at 6-7.
22
morally wrong.  Its scope is limited to a narrower range of morality, with duties we owe 
to others.  Harm to the environment is a value to the extent it is, within a reasonable 
rejection framework, harm to others.  Reasons for rejection are personal, but their force 
as reasons may depend on impersonal value, say, if people are of the view, that protection 
of the environment is worthwhile.67  Scanlon argues that contractualism nevertheless 
applies to a broader range of human action than justice does, because justice has to do 
with social institutions.68  His interpretation of justice as outside the realm of the practical 
reason of individual agents seems questionable, but I think he is simply trying to cabin 
contractualism as something that applies to individual or private circumstances.
Scanlon provides guidance on the form of a contractualist argument. Consider the 
situation in which an agent must determine whether it is wrong to do X in circumstances 
C.  First, “deciding whether an action is right or wrong requires a substantive judgment 
on our part about whether certain objections to possible moral principles would be 
reasonable.”69  From here, we must look at burdens and benefits.  To determine what is 
reasonably rejectable by others, “we . . . need to form an idea of the burdens that would 
be imposed on some people in such a situation if others were permitted to do X.”70
Scanlon calls these “objections to permission.”71  We must compare objections to 
permission to “objections to prohibition,” which focus on benefits to others.72  We then 
67 Id., at 220.
68 Id.
69 Id., at 194.
70 Id., at 195.
71 SCANLON, supra note 1, at 195.
72
 Id.
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can compare these two sorts of objections to derive a judgment about whether X is 
morally permissible.  Scanlon explains:
If the objections to permission are strong enough, compared to the 
objections to prohibition, to make it reasonable to reject any principle 
permitting doing X in C, then one would not expect the objections to 
prohibition to be strong enough, compared to the objections to permission, 
to make it reasonable to reject any principle that forbids doing X in C.73
In contractualism, objections derive from principles, not merely from effects or states 
of affairs.74  This does not mean that principles cannot take states of affairs into account.  
The degree of harm a principle causes is directly relevant to its fairness.  Individuals can 
reasonably object if they are overly burdened.  Contractualism, however, does not focus 
solely on states of affairs; principles guide any consideration of states of affairs.  The 
focus is on why an action is wrong.  Reasons are thus paramount.  This sort of thinking 
should not be exceptional to lawyers.  For example, we would consider accidental harm 
different from intentional harm, even if the effects were the same.  In determining 
whether to build a road or a school or an electrical transmitter, we accept the non-
negligent injury or even death of a limited number of workers and possibly bystanders as 
socially acceptable risk.  We can even determine with some degree of statistical 
confidence that such injuries or deaths will occur.  On the other hand, the law does not 
accept intentional harm inflicted on a few people so that many will benefit.  Scanlon 
offers the example of electrical equipment falling on the arm of a worker in a transmitter 
room of a television station broadcasting a World Cup match. We certainly would not 
73
 Id.
74 See supra note 30 for a discussion of the distinction between ethical approaches based on states of affairs 
versus principles.
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sanction the failure to remove the worker from harm in order to continue the broadcast.  
We would want to rescue her before the match is over.75
We can understand the nature of objections to permission and prohibition is in what 
Derek Parfit’s characterization of Scanlonian contractualism as a “Complaint Model” of 
ethical decision-making.76  In such a model, only individuals can raise objections, which 
means that there can be no aggregation or summing of costs and benefits, because such 
aggregation or summing can result in the burdening of some groups to benefit others.  
Scanlon explains:
A contractualist theory, in which all objections to a principle must be 
raised by individuals, blocks such justifications in an intuitively appealing 
way.  It allows the intuitively compelling complaints of those who are 
severely burdened to be heard, while, on the other side, the sum of the 
smaller benefits to others has no justificatory weight, since there is no 
individual who enjoys those benefits and would have to forgo them if the 
policy were disallowed.77
Utilitarianism permits aggregation, but contractualism does not, except in a very narrow 
range of circumstances involving “ties.”  A tie is a situation in which the moral 
seriousness of, say, two states of affairs is equivalent, but one situation involves harm to 
more people than the other does.  In such a situation, it is permissible to choose the 
alternative that causes harm to the fewer number of persons.  In situations not involving 
ties, which Scanlon seems to think are the overwhelming majority of situations, we must 
look to principles to choose the appropriate course of action.78
Scanlon gives us some hint on how we could apply his contractualist principle to 
questions about global justice.   In a section of his book on whether there should be a 
75 SCANLON, supra note 1, at 235-36.
76 Id., at 229.
77 Id.
78 Id.
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priority for the worst off, Scanlon elaborates two principles, the Rescue Principle and the 
Principle of Helpfulness.79  Both have as their scope the question whether a duty to 
render aid exists.  Aid rendering duties have been the subject of longstanding questions of 
Kantians, consequentialists and virtue ethicists. The basic point of discussion is, how 
other-regarding should I be?  Do I have to depart from my own life projects to aid others?  
Can I consider my own interests?  
Scanlon contends that in some cases the question of priority never arises.80  His 
example is the obligation to keep a promise, a subject he devotes a good bit of discussion 
to in his book.  Therefore, as a preliminary matter, it seems contractualism will excuse 
from the discussion of distributive justice any pre-existing obligations.  Scanlon does not 
say much about this limitation.  It has the potential to be a very significant limitation and 
is worthy of future exploration.
Scanlon says that a principle of priority for the worst off “has greater plausibility 
when we turn from principles whose aim is to create some specific form of protection or 
assurance to principles which tell us how we should distribute some transferable good, in 
cases in which the value of this good to potential beneficiaries is the dominant 
consideration.”81   The cases in which it is most clearly wrong not to give aid are cases in 
which others are in serious difficulties, where their lives are immediately threatened, they 
are starving, in great pain, or “living in conditions of bare subsistence.”82  He articulates 
his Rescue Principle for these cases: “if you are presented with a situation in which you 
can prevent something very bad from happening, or alleviate someone’s dire plight, by 
79 Id.
80 SCANLON, supra note 1, at 229.
81 Id., at 224.
82 Id.
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making only a slight (or even moderate) sacrifice, then it would be wrong not to do so.”83
Thus, it would be unreasonable for me to reject a moral duty to give a charitable 
contribution to the victims of the recent tsunami.  The Principle of Helpfulness, on the 
other hand, applies when someone else not in dire need would benefit from my help, and 
my help would mean a slight to moderate sacrifice on my part.  
Do these principles seem weak?  They try to steer away from the problem faced by 
moral (but not legal) utilitarianism that it asks too much of agents.  Scanlon allows us to 
consider our own life plans.  Scanlon argues that it would be reasonable to reject a 
principle requiring us to give no more weight to our own interests than to the “similar 
interests” of others.84  He explains, “what is appealed to is not the weight of my interests 
or yours but rather the generic reasons that everyone in the position of the agent has for 
not wanting to be bound, in general, by such a strict requirement.”85
Of course, we must be fair to Scanlon here.  His discussion is limited to the question 
of whether individuals – not governments – have a duty to render aid.  The public 
international analogue is aid and development assistance, though we should not jump to 
the analogy without providing proper reasons for the extension of contractualism from 
the private to the public sphere.  We cannot suggest his principles as anything other than 
heuristics for evaluation of WTO (or other) policies and institutions without some 
account of how contractualism is a public form of morality, something of sufficiently 
broad scope that it is the subject for another article.  The most glaring omission in 
contractualism as it stands now is a theory of justice about public institutions.  The 
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 SCANLON, supra note 1, at 225.
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bottom line for contractualism is that, in contrast to Rawls’s theory of justice, a “priority 
of the worst off” is a “feature of certain particular moral contexts rather than a general 
structural feature of contractualist moral argument.”86   Scanlon admits that such a 
priority is a central feature of Rawls’s difference principle, but he is careful to explain 
that while Rawls starts from the idea that equal participants in a fair system of social 
cooperation have a prima facie claim to an equal share in the benefits it creates.  In his 
constructivist account, Rawls tries to neutralize luck created in the natural lottery of birth, 
nationality and so on.  Contractualism, lacking a political idea of equality, makes no 
claims about equality or initial endowments.  
Do we want to extend contractualism into the public realm, to evaluate in our 
particular case the fairness of global economic treaties?  Some scholars, such as Leif 
Wenar, contend that contractualism is adequate but that the main task of the contractualist 
is empirical and not philosophical.  He argues that “if the causal links are good – that if, if 
rich individuals can in fact improve the long-term well-being of the poor and their 
descendants through direct action with their time and money - then contractualism may 
place on rich individuals quite significant demands.”87   Wenar’s argument is good as far 
as it goes for the construction of a moral principle in the realm of private morality, but I 
believe that we need to do more work to get an adequate account of contractualism to 
compare with Rawls’s theory of justice.  For now, we can use Scanlon’s principles as 
heuristics. 
IV. A Sketch of How to Apply Fairness Criteria: TRIPS and Access to Medicines
86 Id., at 228.
87
 Leif Wenar, Contractualism and Global Economic Justice, in GLOBAL ECONOMIC JUSTICE 81-82 
(Thomas W. Pogge, ed. 2001.
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In his article, “Global Economics and International Economic Law,” Jackson explains 
that “[d]istributive justice suggests a variety of policies within the scope of a domestic 
market: progressive taxation, welfare, safety nets, a social market economy, etc.  But, 
internationally, of course, we have this problem also: the low income countries argue for 
certain preferences.”88  Garcia has done important work on the application of Rawlsian 
principles of fairness to special and differential treatment.89  The next steps are to 
evaluate the basic policies and normative structures in the WTO agreements and 
international economic institutions generally.  
As for normative structures, a place to start is in understanding the fairness of the 
most basic of the traditional tools of the trade lawyer – national treatment and most 
favored nation (MFN) obligations.  When is national treatment or MFN reasonably 
rejectable by a WTO member?  Quotas are also an obvious target of analysis.  From these 
basic disciplines, we could move to examining non-tariff barriers to trade and areas of 
substantive regulation.  TRIPS and the Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary Agreement seem apt 
for some sort of contractualist analysis.  Subsidies is another area in which a fairness 
analysis could tell us much.  The recent Upland Cotton decision, in which the WTO 
Appellate Body, upheld a ruling by a dispute settlement panel that U.S. subsidies to 
cotton farmers in part violated the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement 
and distorted trade, suggests a subject for further inquiry using Scanlonian or Rawlsian 
principles.90  We could assess the fairness the WTO dispute settlement process itself 
88 JOHN H. JACKSON, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF GATT AND WTO: INSIGHTS ON TREATY LAW AND 
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using these principles.  We could gain insights by using the tools of moral philosophy to 
understand, for example, the effects of dispute settlement policies on low-income 
countries or on inadequately represented groups.  In addition to the need for a 
philosophical account to transition Scanlon (and other) ethical theories to conceptions of 
political justice, the next steps are empirical: institutionally oriented studies of the details 
of the world trading system.
As an example, I examine the effect of TRIPS on access to medicines in low-income 
countries.  The subject of access to medicines has received a good deal of attention.  The 
attention focuses on the devastation that disease has brought to the low-income countries, 
particularly countries in sub-Saharan Africa.  Intellectual property rights are but one 
feature of the global health delivery system, one that is isolable and relates directly to the 
work of the WTO.  In this analysis, I do not treat WTO members as “individuals” or 
“groups.”  Rather, the locus of inquiry is on representative groups in and across societies.  
This approach is Rawlsian in orientation, but extended beyond domestic political borders.
The link between poverty, poor health and access to medicines is indisputable.  
According to a report written by economist Jeffrey Sachs for the World Health 
Organization, “[t]he linkages of health to poverty reduction and to long-term economic 
growth are powerful, much stronger than is generally understood.  The burden of disease 
in some low-income regions, especially sub-Saharan Africa, stands as a stark barrier to 
economic growth . . . .”91   The main causes of avoidable deaths in the least developed 
countries are the result of HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, childhood infectious 
diseases, maternal and perinatal conditions, deficiencies in nutrition and illness related to 
91 WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, MACROECONOMICS AND HEALTH: INVESTING IN HEALTH FOR 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON MACROECONOMICS AND HEALTH 1 (2001).
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tobacco use.  Many of these diseases are preventable or curable.  Sachs estimates that if 
developed countries were to allocate only 0.1 percent of their GNP to assistance in health 
care, they could save 8 million lives per year in the low-income countries.92   Sachs 
explains:
This program would yield economic benefits vastly greater than its costs.  
Eight million lives saved from infectious diseases and nutritional 
deficiencies would translate into a far larger number of years of life saved 
for those affected, as well as higher quality of life.  Economists talk of 
disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) saved, which add together the 
increased years of life and the reduced years of living with disabilities.  
We estimate that approximately 330 million DALYs would be saved for 
each 8 million deaths prevented.  Assuming, conservatively, that each 
DALY saved gives an economic benefit of 1 year’s per capita income of a 
projected $563 in 2015, the direct economic benefit of saving 330 million 
DALYs would be $186 billion per year, and plausibly several times that.  
Economic growth would also accelerate, and thereby the saved DALYs 
would help to break the poverty trap that has blocked economic growth in 
high-mortality low income countries.  This would add tens or hundreds of 
billions of dollars more per year through increased per capita incomes.93
Malaria, a preventable disease, all but eradicated in the North, continues to plague the 
South and correlates strongly to poverty and poor economic growth.94
Some consider access to medicines a human right.  The UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights and the World Health Organization accept this approach.95  Article 12 of 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights recognizes “[t]he 
right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and 
mental health.”96  Rights arguments are fatally imprecise because they tell us nothing 
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93 Id., at 12-13.
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about obligations and requirements, and of course, intellectual property rights holders 
have rights that may conflict with the nebulous human right to health.  Rights talk has 
gotten us little.  These rights are either unenforceable or inapplicable.  The international 
human rights covenants require countries that ratify them to conform their domestic laws 
to the covenants.  Countries do not have to ratify these covenants.  Indeed, the United 
States has not ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights.  Some countries, such as the United States, will not ratify a human rights 
covenant unless its laws already conform to the covenant, i.e., unless the covenant 
conforms to domestic law.  Even if a country ratified the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, it would impose no obligations on the country to 
improve access to health care in other countries.  These weak human rights regimes 
contrast starkly to the strong intellectual property rights protection in TRIPS, mandatory 
if a country is a WTO member.  TRIPS is a multilateral agreement; all WTO members 
must comply, though low-income countries had more time to achieve compliance as a 
result of transition periods contained in TRIPS.  I show below how rights arguments go 
wrong and how an alternative formulation, one based on requirements and obligations, 
might work.  Whether obligations on one person or set of persons gives rights to others, I 
leave for future discussion.
A. TRIPS and the Doha Declaration
Property rights have been a prime area of controversy for several centuries.  It would 
be difficult to challenge the argument that no other category of legal rules affects the 
distribution of wealth more than property rules.  Hume postulated as his central reason 
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why people engage in society is for stability in the possession of property.97  His reason 
looks very much like what rational choice theorists characterize as a Nash equilibrium.  
The political economics of British agriculture in seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
worked to produce the enclosure movement in Britain, the so-called first enclosure 
movement, in which the monarchy enclosed commons areas, such as copyholds of the 
yeomanry, to expropriate the rights of small farmers in estates.98
While the battle in the first enclosure movement was over rights in agricultural land, 
the battle in the second enclosure movement is in rights over products of the mind, which 
includes pharmaceuticals and biotechnology.  The contested rights are in intangible 
property, intellectual property.99  Similes and metaphors abound in the literature.  We are 
in the process of the second enclosure movement the “enclosure of the intangible 
commons of the mind” and the “intellectual land grab.”100  The battle for rights in 
intellectual property is “an information arms race with multiple sides battling for larger 
shares of the global knowledge pool.”101  The enclosure of the intellectual commons is 
occurring in various disciplines of science and technology, including in information 
technology and cyberspace, and in biotechnology relating to pharmaceuticals, medicine 
and human genetics.
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TRIPS is one of the most important international agreements relevant to the allocation 
of intellectual property rights in pharmaceuticals.  Although an international trade 
agreement and not a domestic intellectual property law, TRIPS is relevant to the question 
of ownership of rights in pharmaceuticals.  It specifies standards for the intellectual 
property laws of the WTO members.  It is unlike any other trade agreement preceding it, 
unlike anything produced in the WTO framework since the GATT’s humble beginnings 
as an agreement to regulate tariffs.  TRIPS harmonizes intellectual property protection at 
a high level of protection for rights holders, and this is one of its controversial 
characteristics.   
The WTO members negotiated TRIPS as part of the Uruguay Round and it was thus 
negotiated from 1986 to mid-1994.  It is one of the most important developments in the 
WTO regime.  TRIPS has been described as "the most ambitious international intellectual 
property convention ever attempted" and as "the most comprehensive multilateral 
agreement on intellectual property."102  It would not be an exaggeration to say that in the 
Uruguay Round, multilateral co-operation in the WTO regime on intellectual property 
matters transformed from a casual indifference to an intense preference for rigorous 
standards.  TRIPS does much more than impose the traditional WTO obligations of MFN 
and national treatment.  It is the first international trade agreement to specify minimum 
standards of protection and universal coverage of intellectual property rights.  It imposes 
positive obligations on WTO members to protect seven categories of intellectual 
property.103  The standards in TRIPS reflect the high standards of intellectual property 
protection typically found in the intellectual property laws of high-income countries.  In 
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effect, TRIPS harmonizes intellectual property protection.  Low-income countries must 
meet the same standards as developed countries, although under the transition provisions 
of the Agreement, they had more time in which to achieve compliance with the 
Agreement.  Developed countries had until January 1, 1996 to achieve compliance, 
developing countries until January 1, 2000, and least developed countries have until 
January 1, 2006.104  In addition to high substantive standards that all WTO members must 
follow, TRIPS mandates untried procedural requirements for enforcing intellectual 
property rights.  TRIPS directs WTO members on the details of how their enforcement 
system is supposed to enforce intellectual property rights within their borders.105
Moreover, disputes between WTO members over compliance with TRIPS are decided in 
the WTO dispute settlement system.106
Two TRIPS provisions are especially relevant to the affordable medicines debate: 
those dealing with patents and those dealing with compulsory licensing.
TRIPS requires that WTO members make patents lasting for at least twenty years 
from the date of the filing of the patent application available for “all inventions, whether 
products or processes.”107  The pharmaceutical industry was particularly interested in 
having TRIPS require that all WTO members protect product patents.  India, for example, 
has a long history of not recognizing product patents.  India is a low-income country with 
many individuals paying health care expenses out-of-pocket.  For many years India’s 
substantial pharmaceuticals industry, in 2002 the largest producer of generic drugs in 
terms of volume, focused on the reverse engineering of pharmaceuticals and in the 
104
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production of inexpensive drugs for a low-income population.108  Drug prices were in 
India thousands of percent lower than the patent protecting prices in higher income 
countries.  To comply with TRIPS, India had to amend its patent law to recognize 
product patents.  In 2002, India amended its patent law to conform to TRIPS.  The 
Patents (Amendment) Act of 2002, which went into effect in May 2003, recognizes 
twenty-year product patents on pharmaceuticals.109
Compulsory licensing is a concept known principally outside of the United States.  It 
is the license granted to produce a patented product over the objection of the patent 
holder. 110  The license may run either to a government or to a user the government 
authorizes.  TRIPS authorizes compulsory licensing but imposes a number of conditions.  
Before undertaking compulsory licensing, a government must try, “over a reasonable 
period of time,” to negotiate “reasonable commercial terms” from the rights holder.111  A 
WTO member may waive these requirements in the event of a “national emergency.”112
Any use of the compulsory license must be “predominantly for the supply of the domestic 
market” of the WTO member.113  Finally, the right holder must be paid “adequate 
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remuneration in the circumstances of each case, taking into account the economic value 
of the authorization.”114
The Marrakech Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization requires that 
the WTO members hold ministerial conferences at least once every two years.115  A 
ministerial conference is the highest level of decision making in the WTO system.  The 
WTO members held the Doha Ministerial Conference in late 2001.  In that ministerial 
conference, the WTO members agreed on November 14, 2001 to the “Declaration on the 
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health.” 116  The so-called “Doha Declaration” states that 
the WTO members “recognize the gravity of the public health problems afflicting many 
developing and least-developed countries, especially those resulting from HIV/AIDS, 
tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics”117 and “stress the need” for TRIPS to be “part 
of the wider national and international action to address these problems.”118  On the other 
hand, the Declaration recognizes that “intellectual property protection is important for the 
development of new medicines,” and “the concerns about its effects on prices.”119  The 
WTO members agreed that TRIPS “does not and should not prevent Members from 
taking measures to protect public health,” and that TRIPS “can and should be interpreted 
and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members' right to protect public health 
114
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and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all.”120   The Declaration contains 
the following steps that are more concrete:
(1) “Each Member has the right to grant compulsory licences and the freedom to 
determine the grounds upon which such licences are granted.”121  This section informs 
that compulsory licensing is a matter of national discretion.122
(2) “Each Member has the right to determine what constitutes a national emergency 
or other circumstances of extreme urgency, it being understood that public health crises, 
including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics, can 
represent a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency.”123  This 
section provides that the current health crises in the low-income countries are “national 
emergencies” and that negotiations with rights holders before issuing compulsory 
licenses is unnecessary.
(3) “The effect of the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement that are relevant to the 
exhaustion of intellectual property rights is to leave each Member free to establish its 
own regime for such exhaustion without challenge, subject to MFN and national 
treatment provisions. . . .”124  This provision provides that WTO members may permit 
parallel imports so long as they are not discriminatory.125
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(4) The last section of the Declaration, among other things, “reaffirm[s] the 
commitment of developed-country Members to provide incentives to their enterprises and 
institutions to promote and encourage technology transfer to least-developed country 
Members pursuant to Article 66.2”126
The Declaration left open for future work by the TRIPS Council the problem of lack 
of pharmaceutical manufacturing capability in some low income countries.127
Compulsory licensing would not be helpful towards alleviating public health crises in a 
country lacking the capability to produce drugs.  The TRIPS Council was required to 
report to the General Council by May 2002.  The outcome of this additional work is a 
Decision of the General Council of 30 August 2003, in which least developed countries 
and countries that notify the WTO of their lack of capability may import pharmaceutical 
products from eligible countries.  The conditions for such exporting and importing are 
strict.  I will not go into the details of the Decision here because they do not affect the 
analysis to follow.
B. Refocusing Towards Principles and Obligations
From an economic standpoint, it is widely held that strong global intellectual property 
rights have questionable welfare effects.  From an economic standpoint, TRIPS might be 
welfare reducing and rent shifting, with the rents shifting from the poor to the rich.  It is 
not at all clear that intellectual property rights are necessary for innovation.128  I will not 
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spend time explaining these economic points, as others have spent a good deal of effort 
on them.  Add to these findings of normative welfare economists the findings of political 
economists, who argue that TRIPS is the product of industry capture,129 and we certainly 
have a questionable state of affairs even from an efficiency point of view.  
Part of the problem is a poverty of discourse, stemming from the focus on property 
rights.  The contentious compulsory licensing permissions coming from Doha are an 
example of how property rights arguments skew the debate. We have to talk about 
derogations from those rights and go through all sorts of efforts to get derogations.  And, 
what if the pro-property rights lobby is right as to particular life-saving drugs?  What if 
the derogations, or some of them, harm innovation in particular cases?
An intellectual property rights regime by itself is an incomplete solution.  Focusing 
also on obligations or requirements will allow for the stimulation of innovation while 
simultaneously providing for access to medicines in low-income countries.
1. The Rawlsian Approach
Though this article introduces a Scanlonian approach to examining the question of 
fairness of trade agreements, we should also examine how a Rawlsian approach might 
fare.  Let us apply Rawls’s second principle to the problems associated with intellectual 
property rights and affordable medicines.  This second principle itself contains two 
principles, the fair equality of opportunity principle and the difference principle.  We will 
not be able to come up with definitive answers because we need more empirical work, 
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but we can put forth a framework for carrying on the analysis and reach tentative 
conclusions.
Here is how the analysis would proceed in determining whether TRIPS contravenes 
the fair equality of opportunity principle.  In the context of the substantial need for 
affordable medicines in the low-income countries, the first question is whether TRIPS 
results in or contributes to over-protection of intellectual property rights.  It results in 
over-protection to the extent that the rights that it creates and protects impair what 
Norman Daniels calls normal species functioning.  According to Daniels, “impairments 
to normal species functioning reduce the range of opportunity we have within which to 
construct life-plans and conceptions of the good we have a reasonable expectation of 
finding satisfying or happiness-producing.”130  Daniels defines health care broadly.  He 
divides heath care needs into five categories: (1) adequate nutrition and shelter, (2) 
sanitary, safe and unpolluted living and working conditions; (3) “exercise, rest, and other 
features of healthy life-styles;” (4) “preventive, curative, and rehabilitative personal 
medical services;” and (5) “non-medical personal and social support services.”131  He 
accepts that normal species functioning may vary across countries.  For our purposes, 
however, the variance does not matter, since the focus here is on basic health care.  If 
over-protection of property rights in TRIPS impair these goods or their functional 
equivalents, then they violate the fair equality of opportunity principle.
The focus on affordable medicines in low-income countries is on Daniels’ fourth 
category, the availability of medical services, including access to medicines to combat 
HIV AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis and other diseases common in low-income countries.  
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To the extent that TRIPS impairs the ability of persons in low-income countries to obtain 
medicines of this sort, it violates the fair equality of opportunity principle.  To meet the 
fair equality of opportunity principle, it is not required that these medicines be “free” or 
without cost to users.  Rather, they should not be so costly as to unreasonably impair the 
life plans of individuals in the countries in question.  In short, they should be affordable, 
with affordability determined based on some sort or means testing.    
Though more research directly on these questions is necessary, the tentative evidence 
suggests that the fair equality of opportunity principle is not met in many situations in the 
low-income countries.  Prices that are “patent protecting” make many drugs out of reach 
of persons in many representative groups in the low-income countries.  Risking an 
oversimplified picture of an otherwise rich contracting and firm structure, consumers 
(which may be countries where a public health system is the primary buyer of drugs) 
typically buy drugs from three kinds of sellers.  First, they buy from the drug 
manufacturers themselves.  This first avenue requires importing either from the firms 
who hold the patents for the drugs or from firms licensed by the patent holder to produce 
the drugs.  Second, they import from a generic manufacturer, who might make the drug 
without any license from the patent holder, a possible solution only prior to when TRIPS 
came into full force.  Third, they could buy the drugs from producers inside their own 
borders, who do not necessarily hold any license from the patent holder.  India, for 
example, prior to bringing its patent system into compliance with TRIPS, could produce 
drugs cheaply and generically because it did not recognize product patents.  TRIPS 
essentially collapses all these transaction forms into one: purchases from patent holders 
or their authorized producers.  Doha provides some limited exceptions for compulsory 
licensing but it is too early to assess its effect.  
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The UN Millennium Project Task Force on HIV/AIDS, Malaria, TB, and Access to 
Essential Medicines describes as a barrier to the development of affordable new 
medicines the following:
[TRIPS] may block access to affordable new medicines and vaccines. 
After January 2005, generic production in India, the source of many vital 
existing medicines for developing countries without productive 
capabilities, will be fully subject to TRIPS provisions . . . .  Concerns  also 
exist that the August 30, 2003, decision reached by the WTO General 
Council concerning a waiver for TRIPS Article 31(f) (which would  allow 
a compulsory license to be issued by the country in need and  by the 
country that can produce the medicine for export) will be too cumbersome 
for developing countries to exploit . . . . Finally, the growing number of 
bilateral and regional trade agreements with major trading partners, such 
as the United States and the European Union, may often contain 
provisions that limit developing countries’ use of existing flexibilities 
under TRIPS to protect public health (such as restrictive compulsory 
licensing conditions and parallel importation  provisions, extended data 
protection, and forcing medicines regulatory  agencies to take on national 
patent office oversight duties).132
This article provides only a sketch of how to apply the Rawlsian criteria and therefore 
it does not provide any sort of statistical correlation between normal species functioning 
and drug prices, though the connection seems clear enough for some tentative 
conclusions.  The logic is as follows: Illness is a major reason why people in low-income 
countries are poor.133  People in low-income countries are ill in large part because they 
cannot afford drugs to prevent or cure disease.  Finally, they cannot afford drugs because 
of high patent protecting prices.  The WHO has found:
The consequences of this inadequacy include an enormous loss of life 
from preventable or treatable diseases (such as tuberculosis, pneumonia, 
acute respiratory infections, malaria, diabetes, and hypertension) and 
significant human suffering, particularly among the poor and marginalized 
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populations of the world. The lack of access to life-saving and health-
supporting medicines for more than 2 billion poor people stands as a direct 
contradiction to the fundamental principle of health as a human right. 
Illness is a major reason that the nearly poor slide into profound poverty.  
Illness decreases people’s ability to work (be it remunerative or not). 
Illness orphans children and prevents them from getting the education they 
need. Women and children make up the majority of the poor, and their low 
status in many societies often means that they have even less access to 
medicines. Improving access to medicines must be a key component of 
strategies to strengthen healthcare.134
The WHO estimates that one-third of the world’s population, about 1.7 billion people, 
lack access to the most basic essential medicines.135  In the poorest countries this figure 
increases to one-half.136  The WHO and the United Kingdom Department of Finance and 
International Development (DFID) have estimated that proper access to medicines would 
save about 4 million lives annually.137  From the standpoint of burdens on worst off 
groups, the poorest of the poor, pay the highest out-of-pocket expenses for medicines.138
Public sectors in developing countries cannot provide affordable medicines reliably.139
Medical insurance schemes cover only eight percent of the population in Africa and these 
schemes may not cover prescription medicines.140  The DFID has found a “mismatch 
between pharmaceutical needs in developing countries and the current nature of the 
global pharmaceutical market.”141   This mismatch is the result of two problems that 
relate directly to intellectual property: the inability of people in low-income countries to 
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pay for medicines and the resulting lack of incentives for pharmaceutical firms to develop 
medicines for diseases that disproportionately afflict persons in the low-income 
countries.142
The current regime of global intellectual property rights also seems to violate the 
Rawlsian difference principle.  The difference principle essentially provides that 
inequality must benefit everyone.  As long as the primary social goods of the worst off 
group are increasing, inequality is fair and can continue to increase.  As soon as the 
primary social goods of the worst off group stop increasing, then the society in question 
has reached the maximum inequality permitted.  We can conceptualize low-income 
countries or people in those countries as the worst off groups in global society.  TRIPS 
makes people in low-income countries worse off.  The current global intellectual property 
system, with patent protecting prices, makes the worst off groups, the poorest of the poor 
in low income countries, even worse off, while benefiting better off groups such as 
pharmaceutical firms in high-income countries.  Much of the empirics that would support 
the analysis under the fair equality of opportunity principle would be relevant in the 
application of the difference principle as well.  The main difference in the analysis, 
however, would be that Rawls’s analysis of the difference principle facilitates some 
mathemetization in the form of comparisons of welfare based on the allocation of 
primary social goods.
The solutions to unfairness in the TRIPS regime would not differ from those
suggested in the next section below.  Notably, the Rawlsian fairness criteria do not 
specify a particular solution, but we can use them to understand the fairness of a solution.  
This is not a controversial point.  In this sense, ethical standards do not differ from 
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economic standards.  They explain why but not how.  The “how” is up to policy makers 
and lawyers.
As I have stressed in this article, I have not provided a sufficiently detailed set of 
testable criteria for assessing TRIPS and fair equality of opportunity, though I have tried 
to provide a sketch of the issues that need further study.   The purpose of this article is to 
begin the exploration of methods for assessing fairness, not in providing definitive 
answers in the application to a particular area.
2. The Scanlonian Approach
The Scanlonian contractualist analysis proceeds in sketch form as follows.  First, to 
use a phrase offered by Wenar, what do we owe to “distant” others?  The answer in 
Scanlon’s account would be principles no one could reasonably reject.  Using Scanlon’s 
terms, we would examine objections to granting intellectual property rights in 
pharmaceuticals versus objections to not granting them.143  The question may not be so 
binary, and it may be a question of the strength of those rights.  Putting this into terms 
more easily understandable to lawyers, we would examine objections to patent rights 
versus objections to exceptions or derogations from patent rights.  This gets us into 
examining burdens and benefits.  As tentatively sketched out above, the burdens of poor 
health in low-income countries are substantial.  On the other hand, losses to 
pharmaceutical companies do not necessarily follow.144  The benefits are improved health 
in the populations of to the low-income countries are substantial.  It would seem that 
strong intellectual property rights are reasonably rejectable while weak (or in some cases 
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no) rights are not.  Can we develop these arguments through the articulation of a 
principle?
Scanlon’s Principle of Rescue may be relevant. He articulates his Rescue Principle for 
these cases: “if you are presented with a situation in which you can prevent something 
very bad from happening, or alleviate someone’s dire plight, by making only a slight (or 
even moderate) sacrifice, then it would be wrong not to do so.”145  The Principle of 
Helpfulness, on the other hand, applies when someone else would benefit from your help, 
and your help would mean a slight to moderate sacrifice on your part.  It would seem that 
the Principle of Rescue is more relevant, given the dire need for affordable medicines in 
the low-income countries. 
I have sketched out above the burdens that TRIPS places on consumers of drugs in 
low-income countries.  Recent economic research on antibiotics in the Indian 
pharmaceutical market indicates that these losses may be substantial, but that profit gains 
to pharmaceutical firms are orders of magnitude lower.146  Thus, it would seem that 
compulsory licensing or some other form of derogation from patent rights in 
pharmaceuticals could in certain cases result in substantial benefits to persons in low-
income countries with only slight or moderate sacrifice to patent holders.  The Principle 
of Rescue would seem squarely to apply in such circumstances.  
Could we derive a Principle of Equality in Normal Species Functioning from 
contractualism?  Recall that for contractualism a “priority of the worst off” is a “feature 
of certain particular moral contexts rather than a general structural feature of 
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contractualist moral argument.”147  Contractualism, lacking a political idea of equality, 
makes no claims about equality or initial endowments.  Therefore, we might have 
difficulties with strict notions of equality because they might be reasonably rejectable by 
some.  On the other hand, some limited notions of equality will survive the Scanlonian 
complaint model.  A limited form of equality exists in the concept of health care as a 
means to obtain normal species functioning at the level outlined here.  The argument is 
that health care (which includes availability of essential medicines) “has as its goal 
normal functioning and so concentrates on a specific class of obvious disadvantages and 
tries to eliminate them.”148  The focus is not on eliminating all natural and social 
differences, but on eliminating natural and social disadvantages brought about by disease.
What if derogating from intellectual property rights in pharmaceuticals actually 
would do substantial harm to the incentive to innovate, to the point where worst off 
groups, and other groups, are made worse off?  Some avenues nevertheless exist that 
would allow countries to meet the requirements of fair access to essential medicines 
while still preserving the rights of patent holders. The most obvious solution is donor 
assistance to low-income countries for the purchase of pharmaceuticals.  Low-income 
countries tend not to have the manufacturing base to take advantage of compulsory 
licensing.  The donor assistance approach would also avoid difficulties associated with 
parallel importation of generic drugs.  Donors would pay patent protecting prices.  Such 
an approach shifts the question away from discussions of rights to health care to 
requirements on those able to provide assistance to provide it. In the current international 
legal system, no such obligations exist.  Assistance is aid and aid is charity.  Scanlon 
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provides a procedure for deriving principles that no one can reasonably reject and that 
helps us identify obligations and requirements.  Some countries have taken steps toward 
creating such obligations, though these obligations remain essentially self-imposed.  The 
United Kingdom, for example, has undertaken a purchase commitment of 200-300 
million doses each of HIV/AIDS and malaria vaccines if such vaccines are developed.149
One purpose for a purchase commitment is to provide pharmaceutical firms with an 
incentive to innovate in the area of neglected diseases, which are found in low-income 
countries, where affordability at patent protecting prices is a major obstacle.150  Another 
possible form of obligation are trust funds, if countries could be obligated to submit funds 
to them.151
V. Conclusion
Developing and applying principles of fairness to global economic institutions is hard 
work.  It would be easier simply to accept the dictates of power relations within the 
global economic system as a given and go from there.  The limited goal of this article is 
to produce more reflection on alternatives to economic efficiency and other quasi-
utilitarian conceptions of normativity in the international economic order, with special 
reference to recent work in contractualist moral philosophy.  I have tried to develop a few 
modest insights from moral philosophy into heuristics for evaluating trade agreements. I 
have tried to offer an account that differs from the Sen/Nussbaum capabilities approach.  
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The broader notion here is that my approach is an alternative to the Sen/Nussbaum 
approach. 
We are not far along on this process, and have much to do.  Until we derive and use 
principles rather than almost totally rely on states of affairs, we will continue to neglect 
the question of justice in the world trading system. 
